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Risky Measures: Governing Democratic Futures through the Assembling of Iran’s 
Waterways in the Infrastructure of International Development 
 
Katayoun Shafiee 




A burgeoning scholarship has taken seriously the use and management of the world’s freshwater 
as a site of critical investigation while highlighting the contribution of science and technology 
studies in making the infrastructural life of water visible. However, studies say little about the 
calculative terms of the decision-making process involved in infrastructural appraisal and are 
often taken for granted as something inevitable. This article examines the unexpected and 
remarkable role that cost-benefit analysis played in governing Iran’s democratic future through 
the assembling of a dam in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis traveled the 
world by flows of water. I investigate the ways in which the calculation of risk generated by the 
device of cost-benefit analysis of neoclassical economics became over several decades the most 
influential language for explaining and organizing the relationship between humans and nature in 
southwest Iran. The waters of the Dez River and other major rivers of the world shaped the 
building of large-scale infrastructural projects around dams, but they were simultaneously 
entangled with the production of economic information about the costs and benefits to the local, 
making possible the development of new methods of governing democracies in terms of risk. 
US-based government aid agencies, institutions of global economic governance, private 
American investors, engineers, and agricultural scientists converged in a small corner of Iran to 
transform the region, its water, and its farmers into a laboratory of grass-roots democracy for a 
profit. 
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It should be remembered that [Iran’s] essential economy can be summed up in one word “water” 
NS Roberts, Board of Trade, 1 May 1946, FO 371/52763. 
 
On the heels of the Anglo-American engineered overthrow of Iran’s reformist nationalist 
government in August 1953, the national newspaper, Etela’at, first advertised the government’s 
‘extensive plans’ for the economic transformation of Khuzestan province in southwest Iran along 
the Persian Gulf.1 According to the provincial governor, the development of the agricultural and 
industrial sectors would address the worsening crisis of unemployment in the region, specifically 
through the construction of dams. Khuzestan province was known for being home to the largest 
oil refinery in the world and the major oil producing fields of the Middle East. However, US 
 2 
government development experts based in Iran argued that water not oil was ‘liquid gold’ to the 
Middle East, and Khuzestan embodied major opportunities for irrigation, flood control, and 
increased food production such as sugar.2  In subsequent years, national newspapers advertised 
‘a politics of material promise’ exemplified by the flourishing future of Khuzestan province as a 
model for the world and the primary source of foodstuffs for the nation (Schayegh, 2012: 627). 
This politics was embodied in the technical structure of the Dez Dam, a ‘high-arch dam’ planned 
to reach a height of over 200 meters with a reservoir capacity of 3,350 million cubic meters and 
the potential to produce 520,000 kilowatts of electricity, along with drinking water (Figure 1).3 
 Commenced in 1959, the Dez Dam was renamed the Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlevi 
Dam on the occasion of the ruling monarch’s visit to the site at its inauguration in March 1963. 
Built on the Dez River, a tributary of one of the largest rivers in the Middle East (Karun River), 
it was the first of fourteen multi-purpose dams planned for diverting and controlling the five 
major waterways of the region (Lilienthal, 1959b: 135). The dam was based on the Tennessee 
Valley Authority’s (TVA) 1930s model of integrated river basin development for revitalizing the 
depressed areas of the American South (Clapp, 1957: 9). Starting in the 1940s, the development 
of the Khuzestan river basins formed part of massive projects for transforming nature to support 
Cold War strategies of combatting the spread of Communism in the Middle East through river 
basin development programs centered on high dams (Tucker, 2010: 139). American political 
strategists relied on the Cold War framing to consolidate a new order of growing US hegemony, 
the collapse of empire, and the institutionalization of economic expertise at agencies such as the 
World Bank through the publication of statistics and the proliferation of political programmes 
defining as their object separate economies in a global political order of nation-states (Mitchell, 
2011b: 138). The policy was shaped by American development economists such as W.W. 
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Rostow who espoused modernization theory as a means of bringing political stability to the 
Middle East (Popp, 2008). Thus, the technical structure of the dam embodied the possibility for 
democratic forms of politics through the pursuit of ‘economic growth’ and top-down economic 
planning among an elite group of technocrats. Advertised as ‘[a] technical tool for social change’ 
in the Middle East (White, 1957: 157), large-scale dams were a way to manage not just irrigation 
and power systems, but relations between the Global North and new states in the Global South, 
through economic development agreements with foreign firms (Lilienthal, 1959b: 134).  
 The problem was that United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
representatives were ‘doubtful if anything could ever be accomplished in Khuzestan owing to the 
salinity of the soil and water and the unbearable climate.’4 The FAO was an initiator of regional 
meetings on irrigation practices in the Middle East, one of the first of which was held in Tehran, 
Iran in 1954.5 A 1958 World Bank study confirmed that salinity problems were a serious 
impediment to agricultural productivity in Iran. In the arid Khuzistan plains, the problem had 
existed ‘since ancient times.’6 Making matters worse, Iran’s Independent Irrigation Agency, 
established with FAO assistance in 1943, had failed to address the lack of regulations for water 
rights, water payments, and the settlement of land ownership problems, which either delayed or 
halted many of the large irrigation projects in Khuzestan and elsewhere.7 World Bank experts 
complained that Iranian authorities did not see the importance of getting decisions agreed upon 
with landowners and cultivators before commencing dam construction works. Considerable 
doubts were reflected in the World Bank’s appraisal of the economic justification for a sugar 
cane industry and power generation, which would be based on hydro-electric power instead of 
the cheaper, thermal power, which Bank experts preferred.8 Indeed, an FAO consultant to the 
Irrigation Agency advised that ‘Iran must build small dams.’9 This discussion excavates the 
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machinery of the decision-making process through which such a large-scale dam project was 
conceived and built when World Bank and FAO experts alike deemed it a high-risk venture from 
the start.10 
Governing Hydro-Political Futures for a Profit 
Political histories of Iran highlight the Dez Dam’s construction as the embodiment of 
broader trends of state planning and centralization that motivated political elites in large-scale 
modernization and nation-building projects (Bostock and Jones, 1989; Halliday, 1979; 
Katouzian, 1981; Keddie, 2003; Nasr, 2000). In contrast, scholarship in environmental history 
(Sneddon, 2015a; Tvedt, 2010; Unger and McNeill, 2010) and science and technology studies 
(STS) (Alatout, 2009; Barnes, 2014; Bijker, 2007; Carse, 2014; De Laet and Mol, 2000; 
Pritchard, 2011) has taken seriously the sociotechnical properties of water, its multiple 
ontological natures, and the consequences for politics (Bakker, 2012). This study builds on such 
scholarship and the material turn in Middle East Studies (Barnes, 2014; Jones, 2010; Meiton, 
2013; Mikhail, 2013; Mitchell, 2011b; Shokr, 2009) by placing the infrastructural work of the 
Dez dam project at the center of the analysis to explore its entanglement in new forms of 
engineering and economic knowledge. The analysis is based on archival research at the World 
Bank Archives, the US and British national archives, the papers of the Development and 
Resources Corporation, and Iranian hydraulic engineering journals and periodicals. Drawing on 
tools from STS, I investigate the ways in which the calculation of risk generated by the device of 
cost-benefit analysis of neoclassical economics became the most influential language for 
explaining and organizing the relationship between humans and nature in Khuzestan.11 The 
technological system centered around the dam generated hazards and controversies it was not 
capable of controlling. In the process of its construction, the materials of the dam were bound up 
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with the production of information not only about water and the dam itself but the project’s 
impacts (Barry, 2013: 19). The convergence of the novel concept of integrated river basin 
development with economic statistics played a vital role in demarcating a space for intervention 
that precluded an analysis of land inequality, the hierarchy of sociotechnical relations, and power 
struggles.   
Like the Dez River, the Nile, the Jordan, the Tigris, the Euphrates, and many other rivers 
of the Middle East were dammed up and diverted in the mid-twentieth century on a scale far 
larger than the undertakings of the colonial period. As Mitchell (2011c: 267) explains, ‘the dams 
would store up the rivers’ waters, eliminate systems of flood-basin irrigation, and replace the 
river and its carefully managed seasonal abundance with a permanent arrangement of barrages, 
canals, irrigation channels, and diesel pumps.’ Forms of measurement, know-how, and control 
previously dispersed across millions of hectares of floodplain increasingly concentrated at a 
single site. This concentration of management and information contributed to ways of governing 
that ‘took the management of nature as their object, and the representation of nature as their 
project’ (Mitchell, 2011c: 270). Decisions, reports, reconnaissance flights, river basin surveys, 
and engineering schemes helped manufacture new ways of seeing the natural world in terms of 
techno-economic calculation and description, demarcating a space for expert intervention 
(Porter, 1996). The novel tools of economic statistics and national accounting mobilized 
development concepts formalized by the articles of agreement of the new Bretton Woods 
Institutions established in 1944 – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -- 
to manage post-war development in the so-called third world states (Cooper and Packard, 1997: 
7; Finnemore, 1997: 206). Transnational economic expertise such as statistical tools for 
calculating poverty levels, per capita income, balance of payments, standards of living, and 
 6 
employment converged with national infrastructural projects of damming the rivers of the 
Middle East.  
As a centrepiece of post-war nation-making in the Middle East, US-based government 
aid agencies, institutions of global economic governance, private American investors, engineers, 
and agricultural scientists converged in Khuzestan to transform the region, its water, and its 
farmers into a laboratory -- ideal-type models of ‘grass-roots democracy’ and economic and 
social development on a grand scale (Ekbladh, 2002b; Embry, 2003). Organized around the 
technicized space of the damming of a river system and transforming its energy into unlimited 
hydropower, the constant failures confronted by the project led to the proliferation of economic, 
scientific, and technical reports that constituted what Callon et al. (2011: 233) has called an 
‘enterprise of concealment’ to eliminate controversy. This enterprise was evidenced in economic 
feasibility reports for the calculation of the risks attached to the project. Scholarship and 
feasibility reports alike explain away the failures of the dam project as the product of patrimonial 
politics, bureaucratic mismanagement, inefficiency, corruption, and the persistence of traditional 
agriculture and water management methods.12 The notion of risks and hazards in scientific and 
industrial development is associated with that of rational decision-making but does not permit 
one to describe situations of ‘uncertainty’ or other interests that are said to lie outside the frame 
of the rational (Beck, 1992; Callon et al., 2011: 19-20).13 By taking seriously the technicality of 
the battle within the decision-making process of building the dam, I open a wider frame of 
political dynamics, technical interventions, and social relations involved in governing democratic 
futures by assembling Iran’s waterways in the infrastructure of international development.14 The 
downward flux of water through the soil and the upward passage of salts was as important to 
agricultural productivity as the flow of water access at the surface but could not be factored in 
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calculations of the costs (Barnes, 2014: 167-168). In practice, cost recovery and integrated water 
resources management failed to account for local practices of water production, distribution, and 
use, or the ways in which the materiality of flows and technologies shaped how different forms 
of dispossession occurred (Barnes, 2014: 113).  
Building the dam required putting in place a future, an economy, through which Iran 
would now be governed. Mitchell (2014a: 506-507) has explained this peculiar relationship to 
the future with regard to another World Bank-funded dam project at Aswan in Egypt. Large 
infrastructure projects such as dams produced future returns that could be calculated at the level 
of the economy, making the sovereign state liable for the loans rather than the private enterprise. 
In southwest Iran, feasibility reports indicated that risky measures of damming and diverting 
water flow and overcoming obstacles posed by the region’s saline soil could be managed by 
leaving them to the care of economic mechanisms to resolve emergent political and social issues 
of land reform and water rights (Callon et al., 2011: 227). The decision-making process involved 
in policy planning and calculating costs and benefits did not factor the organizational work of 
statistics peculiar to a specific configuration of ‘state and market’ in the mid-twentieth century 
(Desrosières, 2003: 553). The period was marked by a shift in global economic knowledge that 
involved new methods of counting and comparing income in relation to the unit of the nation-
state (Speich, 2011: 10-11; Macekura, 2015: 30). Novel techniques of governance were co-
constructed with new modes of data accumulation and logics of abstraction (Speich, 2011: 20). 
Over the course of three decades, proposed solutions were aimed less at rectifying water, land, 
and farmer disputes, than at providing a way for devising novel technologies of governance over 
the countryside.  
Globalizing River Planning through Cost-Benefit Analysis 
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Iran’s economic development law of September 1948 marked the birth of the Plan 
Organization (PO) as an autonomous governmental agency established in 1949.15  Led by Abol-
Hassan Ebtehaj (1954 to 1959), former head of Iran’s National Bank (Bank Melli), its goal was 
to fund economic development projects across the country. The Ford Foundation and the World 
Bank supplied Ebtehaj with financial and technical assistance in this institution building. The 
Foundation enabled Ebtehaj to hire a team of advisors from the Harvard School of Government 
to recruit and train a group of Iranian technocrats for the PO (Baldwin, 1967). Both the Harvard 
advisors and the Iranian recruits were PhDs trained in the Anglo-Saxon school of development 
economics.16 Under Ebtehaj’s leadership, the PO’s powers were transferred abroad through the 
direct intervention of a private enterprise, the Development and Resources Corporation (DRC). 
David E. Lilienthal, former chairman of the TVA, founded the American consulting group in 
1955, and along with his successor, Gordon Clapp, advised Colombia, Puerto Rico, Iran, and 
South Vietnam on numerous modernization projects in coordination with US-government 
technical assistance programs (Ekbladh, 2002b: 351; Clapp, 1957; Lilienthal, 1959b: 132-139).17  
In the same year, an Iranian hydraulic engineering journal, Ab (Water), proposed 
economic development programs for each of the large rivers in the country.18 American and 
Iranian infrastructural development experts alike depicted the Khuzestan region in contrast to a 
more verdant and fertile past, or a more prosperous and well-irrigated future which Western 
technical and economic assistance would help bring about (Figure 2).19 They relied on 
geographer accounts of thriving agriculture in the 10th century, particularly sugar cultivation of 
the province, which acquired the name ‘Khuzistan,’ referring to the land of the Khuzi people (or 
Huzi), said to have originally meant ‘sugar cane’ (Bagley, 1976: 26).20 The failure of local 
populations to achieve natural resource abundance became one of the key justifications for 
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regimes of international economic governance and finance to intervene with loans and technical 
know-how.  
American public and private enterprise converged in the political project to build the Dez 
Dam. German engineering surveyors first studied the feasibility of building a dam in the gorges 
of the Dez River in the 1930s (Tucker, 2010: 149-150). After the war, they were in no position to 
compete with the Americans who in 1956, conducted an aerial reconnaissance survey 
discovering ‘an ideal but challenging site’ for a high dam in a 1,200-foot-deep canyon.21 An 
American civil engineering firm, Morrison-Knudsen, won the contract to build the access roads, 
diversion tunnel, and construction camp in 1958-59 but lost the main contract to construct the 
dam and spillways to an international consortium led by Impresit, an Italian civil engineering 
firm, with the US and the UN providing technical oversight. Morrison-Knudsen’s connection to 
the project stemmed from having previously helped achieve the breakthrough in the design of 
dams in the US through its participation in a consortium of the ‘Six Companies,’ which included 
Bechtel. In coordination with federal agencies, the six firms built the famed Hoover Dam, an 
arched dam made of concrete. Morrison-Knudsen and Bechtel used their experience and profits 
from the project to become the most powerful international construction firms after 1945 
(Tucker, 2010: 140). More innovative than the dam’s design was the coordination of economic 
and social development throughout a river basin around key points of major dams. This was 
achieved in the form of the New Deal’s showpiece, the TVA. Thus, the US played a dominant 
role in the ‘domestication’ of major river systems globally and the Dez Dam in Khuzestan was 
the designated showpiece for demonstrating the success of the transplantation of the TVA model 
to the developing world. 
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US-led globalizing river planning -- the design of large dams and the implementation of 
the integrated river basin concept – could not simply be imposed.  A less visible actor emerged in 
the format of cost-benefit analysis to help appraise the risks or the economic costs and social 
benefits of river basin development concentrated at the site of a dam. Multipurpose river 
development and accounting shaped the ways that experts at the DRC and the PO rationalized 
river planning. The goal was to develop not just physical resources (land, people, water), but the 
location-less economy in terms of growth (e.g. national income), which was a prevalent method 
used by governments. Like the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the reliance on economic models for 
calculating the desirability of a public works project and the opportunity cost of undertaking the 
project enabled dam construction to be ‘sanctioned by the logic of state investment in economic 
growth and…justified as economically rational behavior (Shokr, 2009: 25).’ The language of 
multipurpose development and the possibility of achieving it in one massive project was vital to 
a regime’s perception of why dams were so important to economic development.22  
Cost-benefit analysis traveled the world by flows of water. Its incorporation in public 
decision-making originated in government planning dating back to attempts by the French Corps 
of State Civil Engineers to appraise the social benefits of public infrastructure projects in 19th 
century France (OECD, 2006: 16). Most notable from this group was the Italian-born economist 
and engineer, Jules Dupuit, who was among the first to analyze the economic problems, or the 
‘cost-effectiveness,’ of public works projects with regard to water flow and charging French 
consumers for its use.23 By the 1920s-30s, the concept of ‘externality,’ the cost or benefit that 
affects a party who did not choose to incur it, was formalized within the theory of welfare 
economics.24 In a parallel development, the US Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927 helped formalize 
flood control, navigation, power policy, and irrigation as one unit of development. It authorized 
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the US Army Corps of Engineers to apply cost-benefit analysis to determine the feasibility of 
waterway projects (Porter, 1996: 148; White, 1957: 170). The subsequent TVA Act of 1933 
consolidated the river as a unit in legislation (Wengert, 1952). It transformed the Tennessee 
Valley into a pilot project targeted by the Army Corps of Engineers to test integrated river basin 
development and demonstrate the program’s feasibility (White, 1957: 171). Along with the US 
Bureau of Reclamation, established in 1902 in response to the need for massive irrigation 
systems to water the arid states of the American West, the Army Corps of Engineers provided 
‘the world’s largest cadre of experienced river basin managers by the 1930s’ (Tucker, 2010: 
140).25 After World War Two, these two agencies were well positioned to become development 
advisers to governments around the world and were available to lead feasibility and pre-
investment surveys. By the 1950s, the complex forms of calculation required by dam 
construction gave rise to the formal economic field of cost-benefit analysis which development 
experts and national planners used to appraise the Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Pa Mong Dam 
in Southeast Asia, and the Dez Dam in Iran (Tucker, 2010: 140).26 The waters of the Dez River 
and other major rivers of the world shaped the building of large-scale infrastructural projects 
around dams, but they were simultaneously entangled with the production of economic 
information about the costs and benefits to the local population, making possible the 
development of new methods of governing democracies in terms of risk.27 
 In order to calculate the costs and benefits of global river planning strategies at the local 
and national levels, new forms of technical and economic description of Iran’s waterways were 
required that did not previously exist. The American and British governments agreed that the 
Middle East provided an ideal setting for the absorption of international development 
‘specialists’ such as surveyors, statisticians, meteorologists, soil chemists, industrial chemists, 
 12 
and economic entomologists.28 The two governments hoped that with financial support from the 
World Bank, ‘the attitude of the Middle East governments towards development might become 
far more positive….’29 In 1948, the US Ambassador expressed particular interest in the 
development of Khuzestan’s sugar cane industry and wheat growing.30 The passage of Iran’s 
economic development law marked the generation of novel forms of national statistics and an 
official ‘Handbook of Agricultural Statistics of Iran’ compiled by Gideon Hadary, research 
attaché at the American Embassy in Tehran.31 By the 1950s, Clapp and Lilienthal, the former 
directors of the TVA, were well positioned to advise Ebetehaj and the PO in the economic 
transformation of the Dez River, understood in terms of agricultural and industrial output. 
Technical practices in economics and engineering mixed with ideas of development and 
progress in Ab, the Iranian hydraulic engineering journal.32 Discussions reveal a concerted effort 
among engineers and development experts to collect quantitative data on the country’s rivers, the 
risk of flooding, and the costs.33 The use of demographic statistics correlated with cultivated 
surface area helped illustrate Iran’s unfolding crisis. A growing concern was the problem of 
‘water scarcity’ in connection with the urgency of feeding larger populations, addressing 
population growth, the rising prices of foodstuffs, and supporting increased agricultural 
productivity.34  TV Andersen, from the Agricultural Division of the Department of Technical 
Operations at the World Bank, echoed these concerns arguing that alongside the problem of 
‘overpopulation’ of agricultural land, the scarcity of water, not land, was the ‘general limiting 
factor’ to Iran’s increased agricultural productivity.35 The problem of supporting a larger 
population (rural population of 16 million) in relation to the cultivated area (5 million hectares) 
and the income generated from agriculture was now discussed in relation to the much bigger 
problem of national income. Combined with Iran’s complicated land tenure system, this 
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produced a living standard at the subsistence level (10-12,000 Rials of net income). There was 
one family to every 1-2 hectares of cultivated land indicating to experts that productivity per man 
hour and per area unit was low. Framing rural poverty in terms of natural resource scarcity and 
over population enabled experts to avoid questions of wealth and land redistribution.36 Iran had 
spent the past decade gathering the relevant data but more engineering expertise was required to 
understand the novel properties of water in cubic meters, the science of water measurement, and 
climate statistics.37 New formulas were devised for calculating whether irrigation was necessary 
in a particular area.38 Relying on standardized equivalencies for calculating the profitability of 
water made Iran’s water problems visible, leading to the contention among some engineers that 
there was a need for many small dams to collect spring and winter waters.39  In the post-World 
War II order, development practitioners, social scientists, engineers, and national planners 
coordinated in enrolling the device of cost-benefit analysis to transform Iran’s waterways into 
techno-political matters of local, national, and international concern.  
Democratic Voluntary Operation  
The goals of globalizing river planning strategies were in stark contrast to older 
understandings of rivers and local practices of water use which did not refer to water as a 
simplified ‘resource’ amenable to manipulation through ‘unified river basin’ or ‘water resource 
management.’ The unified concept was new but not the importance of water for farming, power, 
and navigation, which was discussed in prewar-Iranian and western scientific journals. 
Knowledge about water was dispersed and the flows of a river were not an obstacle to be 
overcome with technology or a set of resources, restrictions, and risks open to foreign 
intervention (Mitchell, 2011c: 266). Specialists in the natural and environmental sciences and 
commercial geography produced the first Western accounts of Iran’s waterways in the 19th 
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century (Curzon, 1890; Graadt van Roggen, 1905; Layard, 1846; Rawlinson, 1839; Shelby, 
1844). Visions of environmental neglect or possibility framed geographical descriptions of the 
country’s rivers along with maps detailing steam navigation routes to justify the intervention of 
British colonial enterprise. Farmers in Khuzestan, however, practiced their own forms of water 
management and land ownership that had nothing to do with 19th century orientalist imaginaries 
of the environment or 20th century TVA models of multipurpose river development.  
The nature of a river’s water was integrally related to the nature of the land. The existing 
land tenure system in Khuzistan was known as bonku (Salmanzadeh and Jones, 1981: 207). 
According to Salmanzadeh and Jones (1981), each year prior to winter and summer cultivation, 
the farmers would form themselves into a number of bonkus of up to five people. Membership in 
a bonku was voluntary and not necessarily permanent, often arising from friendship, trust, and 
family ties. Members of each bonku selected a representative, the sarbonku, who would 
participate in the drawing of lots for seasonal land allotment. He was also in charge of collecting 
dues from the members for the village functionaries (e.g. the irrigator, the protector of the fields, 
and so on) and organizing communal work, such as cleaning and repairing the village irrigation 
ditches.  Andersen, the World Bank agricultural expert, viewed this ‘democratic voluntary 
operation’ as too complex because it ‘considerably impede[d] improvements and changes in 
agricultural methods.’40 But forms of land ownership and water use implemented in the 
American South could not simply be transported to a small corner of southwest Iran.  
Practices of basin and perennial irrigation persisted in Iran prior to the emergence of the 
modern dam.41 Due to the absence of surface water in many parts of Iran, Iranians first invented 
an ancient water system maintained throughout the country known as qanat or ‘vertical shafts 
connected by gently sloping tunnels that direct water from higher regions with no need for 
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pumps’ (Keddie, 2003: 151; Beaumont, 1974: 421). A ‘special aspect of [Iran’s] ancient 
irrigation was [that] water was artificially lifted from canals to the fields…automatically 
reduc[ing] the danger of over-irrigation and salination.’42 Accessing and using water from the 
qanat was relatively cheap but could not be considered a reliable source of water supply due to 
its dependence on ground water levels (Ghazi, 1977: 598). According to the theory of cost-
benefit analysis, seasonal variation in the qanat discharge translated as ‘wasted’ supply during 
winter months when agricultural demand for water was low whereas water was in short supply 
during summer months when water river discharges were minimal (Ghazi, 1977: 598; Beaumont, 
1974: 421). Carefully managed seasonal abundance was not the goal of large-scale irrigation and 
agriculture. Rather, its goal was the maximization of water use and distribution for year-round 
economic productivity. 
The mirab was the water distributor in the village nominated by local landowners but not 
necessarily living in the village (Ghazi, 1977: 77). The old regime of main canals and their 
branches was governed by the water level of the rivers (Ghazi, 1977: 176-177). Strict regulations 
governed ownership of the canals serving the fields, belonging either to one or a group of 
landowners. Working on behalf of landowners, water distributors were responsible for the de-
silting of canals and the construction of temporary diversion works. The construction of 
brushwood and stone dams, for example, dated back over a hundred years helping to divert water 
to the fields through a hand dug irrigation channel network.43 With a short supply of water for 
agriculture, irrigated land in Khuzestan was discussed in terms of minutes or hours of water 
application.44 Farmers did not pay for water nor was the amount controlled, and the ownership of 
water was not necessarily in the same hands as the ownership of land (Salmanzadeh and Jones, 
1981: 202, 197). These complex collectives of water management, distribution, and ownership 
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emerged within local ecologies of agriculture, settlement, land and water use which were not 
concentrated at one site or understood in strictly economic terms. 
The establishment of the Independent Irrigation Agency in 1943 distributed greater state 
control over irrigation practices, which also extended to non-state owned qanats (Ghazi, 1977: 
176). The Agency was authorized to form ‘boards’ for ensuring the regular division and 
distribution of water and the maintenance of water works, consisting of a collective of ‘landlords 
and the people receiving water supplies’ (Ghazi, 1977: 77-78). The land reforms of the 1960s 
enabled the Iranian government to exert further control over the countryside by redistributing 
land from a few powerful landowners (Salmanzadeh and Jones, 1981: 202). The 1968 
nationalization of water resources transformed water into the natural wealth of the nation, 
authorizing the Ministry of Water and Power to issue permits for water use (Beaumont, 1974: 
418-419). In practice, however, the mirab still oversaw the division of water but was empowered 
by the ‘Regional Power Authorities’ such as the Khuzestan Water and Power Authority 
(KWPA). Thus, the powers of the local water distributor in rural areas remained significant given 
his close ties to absentee landowners and later, with water authorities.  
The PO-initiated multipurpose water projects in Iran, including a number of large 
reservoir dams (Beaumont, 1974: 418-419), coincided with state-led reforms to redistribute land 
and compel farmers to cover the costs of a dam by paying for the use of irrigated water. In 
coordination with the DRC, World Bank, and US government agencies, these actors laid the 
groundwork for generating novel perceptions of the basin in a concentrated space. Isolating the 
forces of nature at the gorge of the Dez River made them more easily observable, manipulated, 
harnessed, described, and represented (Mitchell, 2011c: 271). But as Latour (2004) observes, the 
possibility for ‘recalcitrance’ of natural forces such as the soil meant that their representation was 
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not merely a cultural construction, for the same forces retained their enormous power to refute 
what was said about them, escaping mechanisms of control, or producing unexpected actions. 
Flows of river water and local practices of water use were entangled in the infrastructural work 
of appraising the dam’s impacts giving birth to the globalizing river planning of international 
development, that is, the corporate power of DRC and economic governance of the World Bank. 
Their planning and provision involved negotiating new questions of scarcity, fair distribution and 
calculating the costs and the benefits to the local population. But Khuzestan’s recalcitrant soil 
proved less governable than FAO soil scientists, World Bank appraisers, river basin surveyors, 
and aerial reconnaissance missions had assumed.  
Calculating Economic Feasibility  
By commencing its first “Seven Year Plan” in 1949, Iran joined the initial wave of non-
western governments to adopt economic planning programs in India, China, Egypt, and 
Turkey.45 Drafted by Ebetehaj, the plan was very similar to the ethos and goals of the Bretton 
Woods Institutions with a proportion of the funds targeted at agricultural and infrastructural 
projects (Bostock and Jones, 1989: 95). Iranian technocrats proposed that one-third of the funds, 
or approximately $200 million dollars come from the World Bank and two-thirds come directly 
from the PO, which would be granted complete autonomy by relying on Iran’s oil revenues, 
flowing from the oilfields of Khuzestan province.  
By 1958, thirty European and American consulting engineering firms operated in Iran 
with one exception, the DRC, which retained executive authority to lead the regional 
development program in Khuzestan (Bostock and Jones, 1989: 123). Ebethaj first met with 
Clapp and Lilienthal at a joint IMF-World Bank meeting in Istanbul. With pre-approval from 
Eugene Black, head of the World Bank, Ebtehaj invited Lilienthal to Iran to ‘investigate 
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development possibilities’ (Ekbladh, 2010a: 135). Ebtehaj believed that large-scale dams and 
irrigation projects were a necessary foundation for economic growth (Ekbladh, 2010a: 131). 
Since the 1930s, he campaigned for the formation of an economic bureaucracy to lead Iran’s 
rapid development plans, culminating in the creation of the PO (Nasr, 2000: 100). Ebtehaj was a 
‘growth man’ who measured success by high growth rates and ‘rational behaviour and decision-
making’ (Bostock and Jones, 1989: 89, 128). Surprisingly, Lilienthal was ‘unfazed’ by the 
FAO’s warning about Khuzestan’s soil salinity problems and poor climate.46 As a new kind of 
political actor in the twentieth century, the DRC aimed to sell ‘self-help--at a profit’ (Lilienthal, 
1967). 
DRC reports conflicted with the vulnerabilities of the dam project identified in the World 
Bank’s feasibility studies first drafted in 1959. The DRC argued that integrated river basin 
development on the Dez River would bring agricultural productivity, power generation and flood 
control, a sugar industry, ammonia plant, fertilizer production, petrochemicals, plastics, and 
electricity.47 Iranian hydraulic engineers agreed with their foreign counterparts, claiming a six-
fold increase in productivity.48 To facilitate early loan discussions in 1957, the PO requested that 
the Public Domain Office of Khuzestan confirm that the lands targeted for dam development 
were ‘unoccupied’ and not claimed by title.49 Overlooking the foreseeable controversy in 
confronting local claimants to the lands, the PO expressed a willingness to take the ‘necessary 
measures’ to convert property ownership from local title holders to the DRC.50 But the 
submission of feasibility reports was an unavoidable condition for receiving a World Bank loan. 
Thus, formulating the probable risks attached, the calculation of land and resettlement costs, 
including the properties that would be submerged under water, needed to be factored in any 
economic justification put forward by the PO.51  
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The Department of Technical Operations’ draft report concluded that the Bank would 
‘not be well advised to lend money’ for the Dez project.52  Loan discussions between Lilienthal, 
Clapp and the Bank concerned the 1959 report which proposed two cheaper alternatives for 
irrigation and power based on thermal power. A Bank representative argued that ‘Iran should 
learn how to crawl before it tries to walk’ because the ‘return on investment shown for the 
project is not too favorable and the risks are great.’ Problems of organization, policy, and the 
uncertainties attached to the irrigation program rendered the Dez project ‘so risky’ that other 
regions of Khuzestan were deemed more favorable. DRC representatives countered that the 
economic feasibility of the Dez dam was ‘guaranteed by its power and flood control benefits.’ 
This would ‘offset’ some of the risks of the irrigation program. The ‘greatest advantage’ of the 
multipurpose water control program was that power potential could be considered as a ‘paying 
partner…yield[ing] quite a substantial margin’ to support other aims.53 Discrepancies persisted in 
the analysis of the benefits of flood control generating a World Bank estimate of $40 million 
versus a DRC estimate of $75 million.  The DRC argued that its estimation was based on a 
‘careful study of the facts’ leaving no justification for reducing their figure. The language of 
cost-benefit analysis enabled the DRC to maintain its negotiating position, arguing that 
discrepancies in calculated figures of the benefits appeared to pivot on the Bank’s ‘present value 
method of computation’ which favored thermal-based power generation. Both sides agreed, 
however, that there was ‘more than one agreeable basis for cost analysis.’ Depending on the 
terms of computation and the stakes, the hydro-power project was both feasible and infeasible. 
There was an ambiguity internal to the decision-making process not only about the 
calculation of flood control costs, irrigation, and power, but the benefits to the local population. 
Unable to receive a clear response from the PO and its American partner regarding the nature of 
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property relations and water rights in the region, Bank officials proposed that Iran undertake a 
three-year test case as an economic justification for the extension of the greater Dez project 
(Figure 3).54 Commenced in 1959, the “Dez Pilot Irrigation Project” (DPIP) encompassed 22,000 
hectares and a population of 13,800 people living in 57 villages of an average size of 45 families 
(Ghazi, 1977: 215). Eighty percent of the pilot area was inhabited by locals from the main city of 
Dezful, five percent by Arab nomadic groups, and 5.6 percent by the Bakhtiyari nomadic group. 
The goal of the pilot area was to assess the ability and willingness of the population to adjust to 
new technologies of water control and management under the KWPA, the new government 
agency which had taken over from the Khuzestan Development Services first set up to operate 
on behalf of DRC in Iran. A period of ten years was granted for the ‘full transition to modern 
farming methods in the area’ (Ghazi, 1977: 212-213). The KWPA initiated fertilizer trials with 
FAO help. Satisfied with the control mechanisms in place for monitoring the socio-economic 
impact of the dam project, the Bank granted its first loan of $42 million dollars to the Iranian 
government in February 1960.  
The pilot area was being transformed in order to make of the outside world, Khuzestan 
province, a place in which high value crops would thrive on the hydro-power of the Dez Dam. 
Khuzestan served as a site for transformations of the material and political world densely imbued 
with expertise (Mitchell, 2011b: 139). The readiness with which it seemed this world could be 
manipulated and modelled by cost-benefit analysis reflected not simply a naturally quantitative 
world but the imbrication of conceptual machineries and calculations of economic science in the 
world it was studying. 
The loan coincided with the involvement of the Bank’s sister organization, the IMF, 
which prescribed an austerity package to the Iranian government triggering a severe recession 
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and balance of payments crisis (Nasr, 2000: 99). The 1960-62 economic crisis was connected to 
the monarch’s decision in 1959 to remove Ebtehaj from power due to allegations of corruption 
and place the PO under his cabinet’s supervision. Political challenges including high 
unemployment and the regime’s decision to break its alliance with landowning classes through 
land reform informed the Shah’s decision to give economic initiatives an ‘air of nationalism’ 
(Nasr, 2000: 100-101). Iranian economists concurred that economic growth necessitated the 
establishment of an autonomous national economic bureaucracy. The Ministry of Economy was 
formed one month prior to the inauguration of the Dez Dam in 1963.  
  In the following years, tests proliferated to assess the impact of ‘high-value crops’ such 
as cotton, sugar beet, and alfalfa within designated trial farms.  The ‘Safiabad Agricultural 
Research Center,’ and a soil and water laboratory were established in 1962, and the first two 
phases of the Shah’s controversial land reform program, known as the ‘White Revolution,’ were 
executed in the pilot area (Ghazi, 1977: 220, 222).55 Over 54,000 plots and trials were 
established for ‘testing purposes’ throughout Khuzestan, but concentrated mainly within the 
DPIP area.  
Like the Dez irrigation program, the project to build the Haft Tapeh sugar plantation and 
refinery at the southern end of the project area was both feasible and infeasible depending on the 
interests at stake and the costs to the local. The FAO report on sugar cane culture, submitted to 
the Iranian government in August 1953, highlighted the potential risks and the lack of scientific 
data for assessing its economic feasibility.56 A DRC report revealed that the warnings had not 
deterred the government’s agenda in Khuzistan: ‘A major step toward self-sufficiency in sugar 
supply and restoration of cane culture in Iran were the transcending policy objectives advanced 
for this project.’57 By the 1960s, the project was deemed economically feasible in relation to the 
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future. It would ‘pay for all of its running costs….and yield a margin of income when it 
reache[d] the planned harvest of 4,000 hectares.’ Most crucial, ‘[a]s the interest of private 
landowners in cane culture grows, the wisdom of the concept of the demonstration will be 
proven. This is the acid test of economic feasibility.’ The interests of the local farmer were 
calculable as long as he remained interested in the project to build a sugar cane industry. 
Economic feasibility reports informed the decision-making process throughout loan 
discussions. The reports relied on a set of calculations about the ‘economic return’ from the 
development of high value crops such as sugar cane, the net value of production correlated with 
the percentage of land irrigated, the amount of hydro-electric power generated, farmer income 
levels, and the ‘quantification of farmer satisfaction.’58 Access to these calculations were the 
condition on which Bank officials claimed they would grant future loans to extend the project 
from the pilot area. Loan officials lamented the lack of maps and data, demanding greater 
transparency from the DRC regarding power generation, fiscal information, and water charges.59 
DRC’s reports lacked information concerning the nature of land ownership among farmers, 
productivity levels, and problems with the KWPA ‘overdesigning’ the pilot area and the 
proposed extension.60 It was ‘hard to believe,’ the Bank admitted almost a decade later, that soil 
scientists ‘missed’ Khuzestan’s soil permeability problem.61  On the other hand, the Bank wanted 
the dam project to succeed in order to ‘absorb substantial amounts of bank finance.’62  
The proliferation of costs and inadequacies of the feasibility reports did not deter the 
World Bank from supporting the second phase loans to the PO for the greater extension on the 
remaining 75,000 hectares. The Bank accepted DRC’s 1966 feasibility report and agreed to 
waive the 3-year test period.63 In reality, the DRC had provided so much technical and economic 
data that Bank experts could not assess the material in the time allotted. They could not assess 
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what ‘happened to the position of the average cultivator nor whether the benefits of the project 
are distributed fairly evenly or concentrated among a few.’64  On the Iranian side, the KWPA 
deemed the pilot project a success and that it would proceed with or without the Bank’s 
support.65 As proof, Safi Asfia, Ebtehaj’s replacement at the PO, confirmed the ‘satisfactory’ 
accomplishment of the work funded by the first Bank loan with a glowing review.66 
With his grand plans to industrialize and modernize Iran, the Shah was in a rush to win 
over public opinion, but the feasibility studies were incomplete.67 A Bank mission to Tehran in 
1967 emphasized the persisting problems in marketing, resettlement of farmers, and the layer of 
impermeable soil.68 Yet John Knapp, vice president of the Bank, saw no reason to delay the 
extension of the Dez project into its second phase. Writing to Knapp, a Bank official surmised 
that ‘we would help the Greater Dez project most by staying in the picture….’69 The Iranian 
government pursued the project extension by inviting agribusinesses based in California (Figure 
4).70 A 1968 law for ‘The Establishment of Companies Downstream of the Dam’ granted long-
term leases to US-based agribusinesses to level the land for capital-intensive, mechanized 
farming.71 A DRC official assured Asfia of the benefits: ‘Using what we think are conservative 
figures for both costs and benefits, we have made economic analyses according to formulas 
prescribed by IBRD [World Bank], and arrive at an attractive internal rate of return.’72 The only 
concern, he confessed, was certain ‘assumptions’ about lot sizes that would be made available to 
agribusiness enterprises calculated in terms of the ‘optimum benefits’ produced. These 
assumptions, the official warned, ‘run through the report. Should they prove invalid, we are in 
trouble.’ A 1967 USDA report revealed that the lowest average cost in a mechanized, capital 
intensive process of production was estimated to occur on 640 acres or less, but Dez 
agribusinesses aimed to cultivate crops on lot sizes amounting to thousands of acres (Richards, 
 24 
1975:18). To secure World Bank finance, the Iranian government ignored the costs to the local 
and pursued a line of economic analysis insisting that the pursuit of commercial agriculture in 
the greater Dez area was necessary to achieve a ‘reasonable level of production without 
substantial delays and a satisfactory return on investment.’73 There was no better place than 
Khuzestan for demonstrating to the world that agribusiness was ‘serious about demonstrating 
what can be done through modern methods and management’ to ‘contribute more effectively in 
the crisis the world faces because population is growing faster than world food supplies.’ 
Prioritizing foreign investment would provide Iranian technocrats with the necessary evidence 
for growth. On its end, the Bank did not want to lose its client. 
The Bank’s working party concluded that the project was ‘technically sound and 
economically justified.’74  They reasoned that Iran’s second phase of land reform, working 
through credits to farmers, would help eliminate future obstacles. In 1968, as the Iranian 
delegation pushed for a significant expansion of land area available to agribusiness and 
commercial agriculture from 3,000 to 58,000 hectares, the Bank insisted on a smaller figure of 
20,000 hectares provided that those areas would ‘revert to improved traditional farming’ by 
certain cut off dates. 75  In negotiations with the KWPA and the Iranian government, the Bank 
admitted that its knowledge of what was really going on in the DPIP ‘is practically nil.’76 The 
KWPA’s accounting methods were inconsistent and omitted information on whether registered 
ownership was based on the cadastral survey.77 The KWPA feared that a reliance on villagers to 
increase productivity would not provide the desired results in economic terms.78 Farmers were 
restricting cultivation rather than increasing productivity to avoid paying the costs of access to 
irrigated water (Salmanzadeh and Jones, 1981: 202). In justifying the reversion to abandoned 
agricultural practices that development practitioners first touted as backwards, the Bank admitted 
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that there was ‘no proof’ that modern agricultural farming techniques were better than their 
traditional counterparts.79 The change in attitude marked the demise of the TVA model in the late 
1960s and a broader shift in the international community’s perception of development as 
technologically driven modernization.80 The first goal of any project should now be poverty 
elimination and ‘meet[ing] the basic needs of the people they were aiming to help rather than 
imposing large projects that were often focused on raising economic indicators.’81 Until the 
‘superiority of agribusiness is proven,’ a Bank official warned, ‘nothing will be done to 
jeopardize the development of the traditional farming.’82 The second Bank loan was finally 
granted in April 1969 for $30 million, justified by meeting Iran’s increased food requirements 
and reducing its dependence on imports of wheat, sugar, and vegetable oils. 
As with other dam projects in the Middle East, cost-benefit estimates ignored ‘knottier 
issues such as disrupting the cycle of siltation, disease vectors in the future reservoir, and other 
environmental risks’ (Tucker 2010: 146). The cost-benefit estimate for the Aswan High Dam in 
Egypt stood unchanged for over a decade, ‘politically insulated by Nasser’s circle from 
scientists’ questions about evaporation and seepage of water in the system.’ As in Iran, World 
Bank experts ‘conformed to the Egyptian government’s determination to move ahead’ and 
‘failed to raise questions about sedimentation….’ Though characterized as a technical problem of 
oversight or miscalculation within a closed circle of political elites and technocrats (Rycroft and 
Szyliowicz, 1980: 61), cost-benefit analysis played a central role in the decision-making process 
of infrastructural development because it enabled the management of favorable outcomes and 
unruly actors such as the soil (Li, 2007: 123). The computation did not permit factoring the costs 
to farmers, issues of land inequality, and political struggles. The effect was to weaken the 
possibility for building durable and productive structures for future collective life. Relying on the 
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tools of cost-benefit analysis to determine the economic feasibility of a dam enabled, 
transformed, and inhibited ways of thinking and living collectively. Nature or the water was 
produced in the spaces, flows, measures, and calculations of building the dam.83 Both human and 
the natural took shape in sociotechnical struggles over calculating the future and building access 
to supplies of water, land, and power.  
Recalcitrant Nature 
For over a decade, the impermeability of Khuzestan’s soil created an inherent uncertainty 
in the calculation of the risks attached to the Dez dam, power and irrigation, and sugar cane 
projects. On the other hand, the soil’s biophysical characteristics played a pivotal role in the 
maintenance of techno-political relations organized around the water-based energy system 
(Sneddon, 2012b: 580; Mitchell, 2002d: 49-51). By the terms of cost-benefit analysis, the 
insubordination of Khuzestan’s soil was a negative externality that could not be factored into 
calculations of the project’s feasibility or justifications for a loan. The severity of the problem 
was addressed during the 1967 Bank mission to examine both the DPIP and the DIP. An official 
reported that the problem of ‘impermeable strata within the normal rooting zone of crops’ was 
consistently ‘omitted.’84 Neither the FAO nor the Dutch sub-consultants to the DPIP had 
‘properly identified’ the issue in any of the soil and drainage surveys conducted between 1952 
and 1962. The report concluded that there was ‘inadequate evidence to support many of the crop 
production assumptions and market projects….’ Neither KWPA nor the DRC could explain why 
the problem was overlooked in feasibility reports submitted to the Bank by the terms of the loan.  
The soil controversy persisted during a subsequent Bank mission to the DIP in 1968. 
Identified as a ‘pan condition,’ the feature characterized ‘layers or horizons in a soil profile that 
impede water movement,’ potentially due to a high clay content.85 The condition could be 
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‘induced relatively quickly by environmental changes at the soil surface, such as intensification 
of irrigation’ particularly in semiarid soils. A pan condition within the normal rooting zone of 
soils was a major factor determining whether such soils could be used for agricultural purposes. 
Under irrigation, ‘serious soil moisture management problems’ rendered irrigation projects 
‘uneconomic.’ Poor drainage along with salinity problems plagued the Haft Tapeh Sugar Estate 
within the DIP area. Soil chemical changes were not monitored properly. For the irrigation 
project to succeed, the pan horizon needed to be ‘transported downward into the soil profile’ 
opening up at least two meters of root zone. 
The proliferation of techno-scientific descriptions of the soil and economic calculations 
of feasibility made problems attached to the dam project less salient and its success more likely 
by eliminating any controversy (Li, 2007). Several soil surveys were conducted in the Dez 
project area over the years.86 The FAO Technical Assistance Program conducted the first survey 
in 1956. The report contained technical descriptions based on a general reconnaissance survey 
covering 30,000 square kilometers of the Khuzistan plains. The soil was classified based on the 
‘concept of the great soil groups’ describing topography, drainage, parent material, climate, 
natural vegetation, apparent productivity and liability to erosion.87 The Bank mission’s report 
faulted the FAO for ‘very weak’ classificatory descriptions and mapping of the soil which did 
not corroborate ‘crop production data’ and excluded the costs. The survey’s land classification 
was ‘weak in chemical data and contained no information on soil impermeability, alkali test, or 
boron content.’ Classification relied mainly on ‘visual examination of inherent physical 
characteristics of soil profiles as exposed by freshly dug pits.’ Thus, the ‘limiting chemical 
features of these soils escaped detection’ leading to the report’s erroneous conclusion that 
‘salinity was not much of a problem and alkali was not present.’ The pilot area was ‘undergoing 
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a “freeze up,”’ or a ‘rapid deterioration of soil structure due to increased activity of exchangeable 
sodium on the clay, plus increasing amounts of sodium.’ Probing the soil and examining the roots 
of crops including cotton, sugar beets, and alfalfa, revealed that the soils over much of the 
project area were less than 60 cm in depth at which point an impermeable layer was detected.  A 
much deeper rooting zone was necessary for the crops to thrive. The question of whether the soil 
problem was a ‘deliberate effort’ or due to ‘oversight’ was crossed out in the report and reduced 
to a technical problem of excessive ‘mechanical compaction by heavy cane harvesting 
equipment.’ The proliferation of surveys and reports made the soil problem simultaneously 
visible and invisible depending on the nature of calculations about feasibility. Though entangled 
in this enterprise of concealment, natural (and social) forces retained their power to refute what 
was said about them, escaping mechanisms of control, or producing unanticipated actions with 
political consequences for assembling Iran’s waterways within transnational infrastructures of 
governance, finance, and expertise. 
Conclusion 
 
In 1970, two decades after the initial proposal to build the Dez Dam, a Bank official 
characterized the execution of the project as a ‘comedy of errors,’ pointing to the Iranian 
government’s failure to account for older farming methods and local practices of land ownership 
and water rights.88  Bank missions were not permitted to visit areas with traditional farming but 
managed to observe one farm corporation. As the events of the Iranian Revolution riveted the 
world, the Bank submitted its Performance Completion Report in June 1979. An audit of this 
report was drafted the following year. The performance report identified problematic outcomes 
where the local was consistently excluded and suffered the costs of the dam project.89 The audit 
confirmed that economic feasibility studies overlooked the interests of local farmers making it 
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possible for US agribusiness to enter Iran, although many of them went bankrupt and left. Bank-
funded projects were causing ‘the destruction of traditional villages, removal of population,’ and 
‘involuntary’ resettlement in ‘unfamiliar surroundings….This seems a common characteristic in 
several Bank projects,’ the audit concluded. It also argued that Lilienthal’s influence on the 
Shah’s attitude played a significant role in triggering the ‘diametric opposition of views’ by 
favouring the introduction of agribusiness and farm corporations against the Bank’s advice.90  
To a development practitioner, factoring local points of view meant gaining an extensive 
inventory of the ethnic and nomadic composition of the population, the nature of property 
relations, and the participation of ‘qualified’ locals. 91  On a visit to Khuzestan in 1965, a British 
official observed the striking disparities in housing and work between Iranian technocrats and 
farmers within the project area noting little evidence of ‘social mixing’ between Iranians and 
foreign advisers. Despite historical practices of water use and cultivation in the region, 
technocratic visions of Khuzestan rendered the agricultural population static and in need of 
western education and training.92 The Dez Dam project was not simply a comedy of errors, it 
produced disastrous results because the TVA model of integrated river basin development did 
not fit local conditions nor had it worked in South Vietnam or even the US (Mitchell, 2002d: 44-
45).  
The building of the Dez Dam played a central role in the formation of Iran’s national 
economy and state planning. Novel technologies of aid, debt, and refinancing, introduced after 
World War II, generated controversies that connected development economics, hydroelectric 
power, soil improvement, industry, and scientific agriculture. The excesses of violence and the 
costs spilled into national politics encouraging the pursuit of more plans, loans, reforms, techno-
scientific and economic ways of knowing. The outcome was to transform the waterways and 
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agricultural world of Khuzestan province specifically through the management of risk attached to 
the dam project from the start.  
Rather than seeing the risks involved as the product of rational choices, the passive 
absorption of American development doctrines, or a superficial engagement with development 
ideas, the decision-making process of assembling the Dez Dam was entangled in the procedural 
work of feasibility reports, engineering experts, irrigation technologies, and mechanisms of 
dispossession. I argue that new forms of authority and governance, namely the multinational 
corporation and regimes of global economic governance, emerged out of the infrastructural work 
of building the dam through the calculation of risk. In a small corner of southwest Iran, these 
power relations shaped the expanding technopolitical framework of river basin development 
globally in the twentieth century. The sociotechnical vulnerabilities that they generated triggered 
calls for a return to abandoned forms of water management because they allowed for a ‘more 
democratic division of water…[that] does no ecological harm (Keddie, 2003: 151).’ Modified 
qanat construction might be a better way to address Iran’s current water crisis now that a number 
of its lakes and rivers have run dry. Tracing the genealogy of river basin development in 
Khuzestan helps clarify the complex ways in which the region has transformed from ‘wetland to 
wasteland’ (Bozorgmehr, 2014; Javedanfar, 2013; The Guardian, 2015).  
Economic feasibility reports worked as techniques of intervention and control, but they 
did not bring greater certainty. In practice, the risks expanded and multiplied, such as risks of 
riots (from uncontrollable locals suffering the costs in income, health, and property) and the risks 
of environmental and agricultural disaster. Constraining procedures included the introduction of 
trial farms, training programs, and research centers for the management of local points of view 
and the ‘general interest’ who remained outside the sphere of economic relations (Callon et al., 
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2011: 16, 235). What we see is that decision-making was not based on indisputable scientific 
facts and economic theories but a gradual approach that transferred the costs to the locals who, 
although penalized, were not factored into the decision-making process. Many of the procedures 
of techno-economic development that were deployed over the course of three decades in Iran 
involved controlling ‘overflows’ but without seeking to prevent or eliminate them (Callon et al., 
2011: 10, 235). 
Following the imbrication of conceptual machineries and calculations of economic 
science in the world it was studying has exposed that the waters of the Dez River were multiple 
in nature – political, technical, social, and financial. Iranian government and engineering experts 
took on the environmental imaginary of development practitioners, but there was no clean break 
with earlier forms of regulation, knowledge, and resource practices. The nature of water was 
integrally related to the nature of the land and the political project of remaking the nation. The 
Dez waterway was not just seen as helping overcome Iran’s Malthusian dilemma of 
overpopulation and underdevelopment but was a way of developing multiple sectors of the 
economy within a single unified plan and raising economic growth levels and prosperity. 
Whereas studies argue that ‘technical concerns lay on the surface of deeper failings with 
the developmental approach (Ekbladh, 2010a: 231; Scott, 1998),’ this discussion centered on the 
novel political appeal of cost-benefit analysis, which was a useful tool because it allowed actors 
with different interests to negotiate outcomes and increase their bargaining power. The 
proliferation of feasibility reports also played a legitimizing function to eliminate controversy, 
protect future loans, and attract foreign investment.  Remarkably, the calculative terms involved 
in infrastructural appraisal are often taken for granted as something inevitable. Reopening the 
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black box of econo-technical solutions put forward opens the possibility for mobilizing solutions 
that have greater credibility, techno-politically. 
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